We present a new locally differentially private algorithm for the heavy hitters problem which achieves optimal worst-case error as a function of all standardly considered parameters. Prior work obtained error rates which depend optimally on the number of users, the size of the domain, and the privacy parameter, but depend sub-optimally on the failure probability.
INTRODUCTION
In the heavy-hitters problem, each of n users holds as input an item from some domain X . Our goal is to identify all "heavy-hitters", which are the domain elements x ∈ X for which many of the users have x as their input. In this work we study the heavy-hitters problem in the local model of differential privacy (LDP), where the users randomize their data locally, and send differentially private reports to an untrusted server that aggregates them. In our case, this means that every user only sends the server a single randomized message that leaks very little information about the input of that user.
The heavy hitters problem is perhaps the most well-studied problem in local differential privacy [2, 3, 14, 18, 21] . In addition to the intrinsic interest of this problem, LDP algorithms for heavyhitters provide important subroutines for solving many other problems, such as median estimation, convex optimization, and clustering [20, 24] . In practice, heavy-hitters algorithms under LDP have already been implemented to provide organizations with valuable information about their user bases while providing strong privacy guarantees to their users. Two prominent examples are by Google in the Chrome browser [11] and Apple in iOS-10 [25] , making local heavy-hitter algorithms the most widespread industrial application of differential privacy to date.
Before describing our new results, we define our setting more precisely. Consider a set of n users, where each user i holds as input an item x i ∈ X . We denote S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), and refer to S as a "distributed database" (as it is not stored in one location, and every x i is only held locally by user i). We say that a domain element x ∈ X is ∆-heavy if its multiplicity in S is at least ∆, i.e., if there are at least ∆ users whose input is x. Our goal is to identify all ∆heavy elements for ∆ as small as possible. Specifically, we receive a sequence of messages-one message y i from every user i-at the end of which our goal is to report a list L ⊂ X such that (1) Every ∆-heavy element x is in L, and (2) |L| = O(n/∆), i.e., the list size is proportional to the maximum possible number of ∆-heavy elements. We also want, for each x ∈ L, to output a value which is within ∆ of the multiplicity of x in S. The parameter ∆ is referred to as the error of the protocol, as elements with multiplicities less than ∆ are "missed" by the protocol. We refer to the probability that the protocol does not successfully achieve the above objectives as its failure probability, denoted by β. The privacy requirement is that for every user i, the distribution of the message y i should not be significantly affected by the input of the user. Formally, Solving the heavy-hitters problem under LDP becomes harder for smaller choices of ∆, 1 and the work on LDP heavy-hitters have focused on constructing protocols that can achieve as small a value of ∆ as possible.
In this work we combine ideas from the recent locally-private heavy-hitters algorithm of [2] with the recent non-private algorithm of [17] , and present a new efficient LDP heavy-hitters algorithm achieving optimal worst-case error ∆ as a function of the number of users n, the size of the domain |X |, the privacy parameter ε, and the failure probability β. Prior state-of-the-art results [2, 3] either obtained error with sub-optimal dependence on the failure probability β, or had runtime at least linear in |X | (which is not realistic in real applications, where X may be the space of all reasonable-length URL domains). Table 1 summarizes our result in comparison with previous algorithms for the problem.
We remark that while our focus is on achieving the optimal (i.e., smallest possible) error ∆, our algorithm also allows the server to obtain larger error ∆ ′ ≥ ∆ in exchange for lower space requirements. Specifically, memory usage and the size of the output list may both be improved toÕ(n/∆ ′ ).
Lower Bound on the Error and New Understandings of the Local Model
We strengthen a lower bound on the error by [5, 14, 26] and [3] to incorporate the failure probability, and show that our new upper bound is tight. Our lower bound is based (conceptually) on the following new understandings of the local privacy model:
1.1.1 Advanced Grouposition. An important property of differential privacy is group privacy. Recall that differential privacy ensures that no single individual has a significant effect on the outcome (distribution) of the computation. A similar guarantee also holds for every small group of individuals, but the privacy guarantee degrades (gracefully) with the size of the group. Specifically, if an algorithm satisfies an individual-level guarantee of ε-differential privacy, then it satisfies kε-differential privacy for every group of k individuals. We observe that in the local model, group privacy degrades the privacy parameter only by a factor of ≈ √ k, unlike in the centralized model. This observation allows us to show improved bounds on the max-information-a measure of the dependence of an algorithm's output on a randomly chosen input-of locally-private protocols [7] . Strong group privacy is, however, a mixed blessing as it also leads to stronger lower bounds (of the type known as "packing arguments") for pure-private local algorithms.
1.1.2 Pure vs. Approximate LDP. Another important property of differential privacy is that it also degrades gracefully under composition. This allows us to design algorithms that access their input database using several (say k) differentially private mechanisms as subroutines, and argue about the overall privacy guarantees. In the case of pure-privacy, the privacy parameter deteriorates by a factor of at most k. However, in the case of approximate-privacy, k-fold composition degrades the privacy parameter only by a factor of ≈ √ k (see [10] ).
We show that in the non-interactive local model we can enjoy the best of both worlds. First, we can show that in some cases, (an approximate version of) the composition of locally private algorithms can satisfy pure-privacy while enjoying the same strong composition guarantees of approximate-privacy. Motivated by this observation, we then proceed to show that in the local model approximateprivacy is actually never more useful than pure-privacy (at least for non-interactive protocols). Specifically, building on a transformation of Bassily and Smith [3] , we give a generic transformation from any non-interactive approximate-private local protocol into a pure-private local protocol with the same utility guarantees. This is the first formal proof that approximate local-privacy cannot enable more accurate analyses than pure local-privacy.
In Section 7 we describe how our new lower bound for the heavy hitters under pure-LDP follows from advanced grouposition, and how the lower bound extends to approximate-LDP via our generic transformation. In addition, we provide a direct analysis for our lower bound that results from a direct extension of the argument of [5, 14, 26] (using ideas from [3] ).
PRELIMINARIES FROM DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Notations. Databases are (ordered) collections of elements from some data universe X . Two databases S, S ′ ∈ X n are called neighboring if they differ in at most one entry. Throughout this paper, we use the notationÕ to hide logarithmic factors in n and |X | (the number of users and the size of the domain).
Consider a database where each entry contains information pertaining to one individual. An algorithm operating on databases is said to preserve differential privacy if a change of a single record of the database does not significantly change the output distribution of the algorithm. Intuitively, this means that individual information is protected: whatever is learned about an individual could also be learned with her data arbitrarily modified (or without her data at all).
where the probability is over the randomness of M.
Local Differential Privacy
In the local model, each individual holds her private information locally and only releases the outcomes of privacy-preserving computations on her own data. This is modeled by letting the algorithm access each entry x i in the input database S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n separately, via differentially private local randomizers. Definition 2.2 ( [8, 16] ). A local randomizer R : X → W is a randomized algorithm that takes a database of size n = 1. Let S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n be a database. An LR oracle LR S (·, ·) gets an index i ∈ [n] and a local randomizer R, and outputs a random value w ∈ W chosen according to the distribution R(x i ). Server timeÕ (n)Õ (n)Õ n 2.5
User timeÕ (1)Õ (1)Õ n 1.5
Server memoryÕ
Public randomness/userÕ (1)Õ (1)Õ (n 1.5 ) 8, 16] ). An algorithm satisfies (ε, δ )-local differential privacy (LDP) if it accesses the database S only via the oracle LR S with the following restriction: for all possible executions of the algorithm and for all i
In the above definition, k is the number of invocations of LR S on index i made throughout the execution (potentially this number can be different for different users, and can even be chosen adaptively throughout the execution). In our heavy-hitters protocol we will have k = 1, meaning that every user only sends one response to the server. Local algorithms that prepare all their queries to LR S before receiving any answers are called non-interactive; otherwise, they are interactive. The focus of this work is on non-interactive protocols.
A HEAVY-HITTERS PROTOCOL WITH OPTIMAL ERROR
Let S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n be a database, which may be distributed across n users (each holding one row). For x ∈ X , we will be interested in estimating the frequency (or multiplicity) of x in S, denoted as f S (x) = |{i ∈ [n] : x i = x }|. Specifically, we would like to solve the following problem while guaranteeing LDP: Definition 3.1. Let S ∈X n be a (distributed) database. In the heavy-hitters problem with error ∆ and failure probability β, the goal is to output a list Est ⊆ X ×R of elements and estimates, of size | Est | = O(n/∆), such that with probability 1 − β (1) For every (x, a) ∈ Est we have | f S (x) − a| ≤ ∆; and, (2) ∀x ∈X s.t. f S (x)≥∆ we have that x appears in Est.
As in previous works, our algorithm for the heavy-hitters problem is based on a reduction to the simpler task of constructing a frequency oracle: Definition 3.2. Let S ∈X n be a (distributed) database. A frequency oracle with error ∆ and failure probability β is an algorithm that, with probability at least 1 − β, outputs a data structure capable of approximating f S (x) for every x ∈ X with error at most ∆.
Observe that constructing a frequency oracle is an easier task than solving the heavy-hitters problem, as every heavy-hitters algorithm is in particular a frequency oracle. Specifically, given a solution Est to the heavy-hitters problem, we can estimate the frequency of every x ∈ X asf S (x) = a if (x, a) ∈ Est, orf S (x) = 0 otherwise. Moreover, observe that ignoring runtime, the two problems are identical (since we can query the frequency oracle on every domain element to find the heavy-hitters).
The literature on heavy-hitters and frequency oracles under LDP has focused on the goal of minimizing the error ∆. However, as Bassily and Smith showed, under LDP, every algorithm for either task must have worst case error at least Ω 1 ε n · log |X | . This lower bound is known to be tight, as constructions of frequency oracles with matching error were presented in several works [2, 3, 14, 18] . These works also presented reductions that transform a frequency oracle into a heavy-hitters algorithm. However, their reductions resulted in a sub-optimal dependency of the error in the failure probability β (on which the lower bound above is not informative). In this work we give a new (privacy preserving) reduction from the heavy-hitters problem to the frequency oracle problem, achieving error which is optimal in all parameters. Our reduction is a private variant of the recent non-private algorithm of [17] , and our final construction uses the frequency oracle of [2] .
Existing Techniques
In this section we give an informal survey of the techniques of [2] and [17] , and highlight some of the ideas behind the constructions. This intuitive overview is generally oversimplified, and hides many of the difficulties that arise in the actual analyses.
Reduction with Sub-Optimal Dependence on the Failure
Probability. Assume that we have a frequency oracle protocol with worst-case error ∆, and let S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n be a (distributed) database, where user i holds the input x i . We now want to use our frequency oracle to identify a small set of "potential heavyhitters". Specifically, we would like to identify all elements whose frequencies in S are at least 2∆. We outline the approach of [2] .
Let h : X → [Y ] be a (publicly known) random hash function, mapping domain elements into some range of size Y . We will now use h in order to identify the heavy-hitters. To that end, let x * ∈ X denote such a heavy-hitter, appearing at least 2∆ times in the database S, and denote y * = h(x * ). Assuming that Y is big enough, w.h.p. we will have that x * is the only input element (from S) that is mapped (by h) to the hash value y * . Assuming that this is indeed the case, we will now attempt to identify x * one "coordinate" (as defined below) at a time.
Let us assume that elements from X are represented as M symbols from an alphabet
Observe that since h is public, every user can compute her own row locally. As x * is a heavy-hitter, for every m ∈ [M] we have that (y * , x * [m]) appears in S m at least 2∆ times. On the other hand, as we assumed that x * is the only input element that is mapped to y * , we get that (y * , w ′ ) does not appear in S m at all for every w ′ x * [m]. Recall that our frequency oracle has error at most ∆, and hence, we can use it to accurately determine the symbols of x * . Using this strategy we can identify a set of size Y containing all heavy-hitters: For every hash value y ∈ [Y ], construct a potential heavy-hitterx (y) symbol-by-symbol, where the m th symbol ofx (y) is the symbol w s.t. (y, w) is most frequent in S m . By the above discussion, this strategy identifies all of the heavy-hitters.
Recall that we assumed here that Y (the size of the range of the hash function h) is big enough so that there are no collisions among input elements (from S). In fact, the analysis can withstand a small number of collisions (roughly √ n, since we are aiming for error bigger than √ n anyway). Nevertheless, for the above strategy to succeed with high probability, say w.p. 1 − β, we will need to set Y √ n/β. As β can be exponentially small, this is unacceptable, and hence, Bassily et al. [2] applied the above strategy with a large failure probability β, and amplified the success probability using repetitions. Unfortunately, using repetitions still causes the error to increase by a factor of log(1/β) (because applying multiple private computations to the same dataset degrades privacy). Specifically, Bassily et al. [2] obtained the following result.
Theorem 3.3 ([2]
). Let β, ε ≤ 1, and let S ∈ X n be a (distributed) database. There exists an ε-LDP algorithm that returns a list Est of lengthÕ( √ n) such that with probability 1 − β
The server uses processing memory of sizeÕ( √ n), and runs in timẽ O(n). Each user hasÕ(1) runtime, memory, and communication. [17] .
Non-Private Reduction Based on List Recoverable Codes
Recall that in the reduction of Bassily et al. [2] there is only one hash function h. If that hash function "failed" for some heavy-hitter x (meaning that too many other input elements collide with x), then we cannot identify x and we needed to repeat. Suppose instead that we modify the reduction to introduce an independent hash function h m for every coordinate m ∈ [M]. The upside is that now, except with exponentially small probability (in M), every heavyhitter x * causes at most a small fraction of the hash functions to fail. Then hopefully we are able to detect most of the symbols of x * . If instead of applying this scheme to x * itself, we apply it to an error-correcting encoding of x * with constant rate and constant relative distance, then we can indeed recover x * this way. 3 However, aside from the fact that some of the symbols are missing, it now becomes unclear how to concatenate the coordinates of the elements that we are constructing. Specifically, in the construction of Bassily et al., the fact that h(x * ) = y * appeared throughout all coordinates is what we used to concatenate the different symbols we identified. If the hash functions are independent across m, then this does not work.
We now describe this strategy in more detail, and describe the solution proposed by Larsen et al. [17] to overcome this issue. Fix a heavy-hitter x * . For every coordinate m ∈ [M] where h m does not fail on x * , we have that the frequency of (h m (x * ), in these lists, then we could concatenate the symbols x * [m] and reconstruct x * . The question is how to match symbols from different lists. As was observed in [12] that studied the related problem of ℓ 1 /ℓ 1 compressed sensing, this can be done using list-recoverable codes.
Recall that in a (standard) error correcting code, the decoder receives a noisy codeword (represented by, say, M symbols from [W ]) and recovers a (noiseless) codeword that agrees with the noisy codeword on at least (1 − α) fraction of the coordinates, assuming that such a codeword exists. An error correcting code thus protects a transmission from any adversarial corruption of an α-fraction of a codeword. A list-recoverable code protects a transmission from uncertainty as well as corruption. Instead of receiving a single (possibly corrupted) symbol in each coordinate, the decoder for a list-recoverable code receives a short list of size ℓ of possible symbols. Let L 1 , . . . , L M be such a sequence of lists, where list L m contains the m th symbol of a noisy codeword. The requirement on the decoder is that it is able to recover all possible codewords x that "agree" with at least (1 − α) fraction of the lists, in the sense that the m th symbol of x appears in L m . Formally, Definition 3.4 ( [13] ). An (α, ℓ, L)-list recoverable code is a pair of mappings (Enc, Dec) where
such that the following holds. Let L 1 , . . . , L M ∈ [Z ] ℓ . Then for every x ∈ X satisfying |{m :
In our case, the lists L m = {(y, w)} contain the "stand outs" of S m , with the guarantee that for every heavy-hitter x * , we have that (h m (x * ), x * [m]) appears in L m for most coordinates m. We can therefore, in principle, use a list-recoverable code in order to recover all heavy-hitters. 4 However, there are currently no explicit codes achieving the parameter settings that are needed for the construction. To overcome this issue, Larsen et al. [17] constructed a relaxed variant of list-recoverable codes, and showed that their relaxed variant still suffices for their (non-private) reduction. Intuitively, their relaxed code utilizes the randomness in the first portion of every element in the lists (i.e., the outcome of the hash functions). Formally, 
There is a pre-processing algorithm which, given M, Y , ℓ, h 1 , . . . , h M , computes a description of the functions Enc, Dec in poly(M) time. 5 Then, evaluating Enc(x) takes linear time and space in addition to O(M) invocations of the hash functions, and evaluating Dec(L 1 , . . . , L M ) takes linear space and polynomial time.
We remark that the focus in [17] was on space and runtime, and that in fact, in the non-private literature the meaning of "minimal achievable error" is unclear, as achieving zero error is trivial (it is "only" a question of runtime and memory).
Our Contribution
In the following sections we construct an LDP heavy-hitters protocol and show that it achieves optimal error in all parameters. Our private algorithm is obtained from the non-private algorithm of [17] with the following modifications.
As [17] showed, by appropriately choosing the parameters of a unique-list-recoverable code, the strategy outlined above identifies all "extra heavy" elements, i.e., those with frequencies n/log |X |. In order to identify ∆-heavy elements for some parameter ∆, the first step in their algorithm is to hash input elements intoÕ(n/∆) buckets. Informally, one can then show that w.h.p. the weight of every ∆-heavy element increases significantly relative to the size of its bucket, and in particular becomes "extra-heavy" with respect to its bucket. This allows [17] to focus on identifying "extra heavy" elements within each bucket separately.
Under LDP, however, this reduction to the larger error case cannot be applied directly, as it is unclear at which point to apply the hash function. The server cannot apply it since it does not get to see the users' inputs, and the users cannot reveal their buckets to the server as this would compromise privacy. We overcome this issue by appending the outcome of a similar hash function to the encoding of elements in the unique-list-recoverable code. As we will see in Section 3.4, this allows us to identify all ∆-heavy elements directly in the original database. We obtain the following theorem: Theorem 3.7. Let β, ε ≤ 1, and let S ∈ X n be a (distributed) database. There exists an ε-LDP algorithm that returns a list Est of lengthÕ( √ n) such that with probability 1 − β
The server uses processing memory of sizeÕ( √ n), and runs in timẽ O(n). Each user hasÕ(1) runtime, memory, and communication.
Additional Preliminaries
We start by presenting additional preliminaries that enable our construction.
Frequency Oracle.
Recall that a frequency oracle is a protocol that, after communicating with the users, outputs a data structure capable of approximating the frequency of every domain element x ∈ X . Our protocol uses the frequency oracle of [2] , named Hashtogram, as a subroutine. Theorem 3.8 (Hashtogram [2] ). Let S ∈ X n be a (distributed) database, and let β, ε ≤ 1. There exists an ε-LDP algorithm such that the following holds. Fix a domain element x ∈ X to be given as a query to the algorithm. With probability at least 1 − β, the algorithm answers the query x with a(x) satisfying:
The server uses processing memory of sizeÕ( √ n), and runs in timẽ O(1) per query (plusÕ(n) for instantiation). Each user hasÕ(1) runtime, memory, and communication. TheÕ notation hides logarithmic factors in n and |X |.
Observe that by a union bound, algorithm Hashtogram answers every fixed set of w queries with worst case error
. The min{n, |X |} factor is known Hashtogram [2] ). Let S ∈ X n be a (distributed) database, and let β, ε ≤ 1. There exists an ε-LDP algorithm such that the following holds. Fix a domain element x ∈ X to be given as a query to the algorithm. With probability at least 1 − β, the algorithm answers the query x with a(x) satisfying:
The server uses processing memory of sizeÕ(|X |), and runs in timẽ O(1) per query (plusÕ |X | 2 for instantiation). Each user hasÕ(1) runtime, memory, and communication. TheÕ notation hides logarithmic factors in n and |X |.
We will only apply Theorem 3.9 on small domains X (satisfying |X | 2 =Õ(n)). Our eventual analysis in the proof of Theorem 3.7 will make use of both accuracy guarantees of Hashtogram.
The Poisson
Approximation. When throwing n balls into R bins, the distribution of the number of balls in a given bin is Bin(n, 1/R). As the Poisson distribution is the limit distribution of the binomial distribution when n/R is fixed and n → ∞, the distribution of the number of balls in a given bin is approximately Pois(n/R). In fact, in some cases we may approximate the joint distribution of the number of balls in all the bins by assuming that the load in each bin is an independent Poisson random variable with mean n/R. Theorem 3.10 (e.g., [19] ). Suppose that n balls are thrown into R bins independently and uniformly at random, and let X i be the number of balls in the i th bin, where 1 ≤ i ≤ R. Let Y 1 , · · · , Y R be independent Poisson random variables with mean n/R. Let f (x 1 , · · · , x R ) be a nonnegative function. Then,
In particular, the theorem states that any event that takes place with probability p in the Poisson case, takes place with probability at most pe √ n in the exact case (this follows by letting f be the indicator function of that event). We will also use the following bounds for the tail probabilities of a Poisson random variable: (2) If the X i 's are fully independent, then
Next, we present a limited independence version of Bernstein's inequality.
Theorem 3.13 ([15, Lemma 2]). Let X 1 , . . . , X n be k-wise independent random variables, for an even integer k ≥ 2, that are each bounded by T in magnitude. Let X = n i=1 X i and µ = E[X ]. Let
Then there exists a constant C > 0 such that for all λ > 0,
The Full Protocol
In this section we construct and analyze our heavy-hitters algorithm, and prove Theorem 3.7. The full algorithm appears as Algorithm PrivateExpanderSketch. It is immediate from the construction that algorithm PrivateExpanderSketch satisfies ε-LDP. We now proceed with the utility analysis. While we must make the restriction n ≤ |X | for the analysis to go through, we remark that in the complementary case n > |X |, it is possible to just apply the frequency oracle Hashtogram (Theorem 3.8) to every item in X and obtain the same runtime, memory, and communication guarantees.
of Theorem 3.7. Item 1 of the theorem follows directly from Theorem 3.8 (the properties of Hashtogram). We now prove item 2. Below, we will freely assume that n ≥ O(log |X |/ε 2 ), with item 2 being vacuously true otherwise. Consider the execution of PrivateExpanderSketch on a (distributed) database S. We begin by defining a sequence of events E 1 , . . . , E 7 . We will show that all of these events occur simultaneously with high probability, and that if they indeed all occur, then the guarantee of item 2 holds.
For some constant C H ≥ 1, we say that an element x ∈ X is heavy if f S (x) ≥ C H ε n · log |X |, and non-heavy otherwise. We let H denote the set of all heavy elements. Observe that |H | ≤ ε · n/log |X |. Notation: Let C M , C Y , C ℓ , C д , and C f be universal constants (to be specified later).
Denote M = C M · log |X |/log log |X |, Y = log C Y |X |, and ℓ = C ℓ · log |X |. Public randomness: Random partition of [n] into M sets I 1 , . . . , I M .
Pairwise independent hash functions h 1 , · · · , h M :
Tool used: A unique-list-recoverable code (Enc, Dec) with parameters M, Y , ℓ using h 1 , . . . , h M , as in Theorem 3.6. Setting: Each player i ∈ [n] holds a value x i ∈ X . Define S = (x 1 , · · · , x n ).
For every
(m, b) ∈ [M]×[B], initialize L b m = ∅.
For every (m, b, y) ∈ [M]×[B]×[Y ]:
(a) Let z = argmax{f S m (b, y, z)}.
Use
Hashtogram(S) with privacy parameter ε 2 to obtainf S (x) ≈ f S (x) for every x ∈ H .
Return Est
Here, we made use of the fact that д : X → [B] is (C д · log |X |)wise independent for a constant C д . We next invoke the limited independence formulation of Bernstein's inequality (Theorem 3.13). Fix b ∈ [B]. We will consider the collection of random variables R x indexed by x ∈ X \H defined as follows.
Then each R x is bounded by T < 1 ε n · log |X | and x H R x has variance 
It then follows by Bernstein's inequality and a union bound over
Recall that M = C M · log |X |/log log |X |. We now analyze event E 3 using the Poisson approximation for balls into bins (see Theorem 3.10). To that end, fix x ∈ H , and letJ 1 , · · · ,J M be independent Poisson random variables with mean
. Using a tail bound for the Poisson distribution (see Theorem 3.11), assuming that n ≥ 8C 2 M log |X |, we have that m is bad with probability at most 1 log C M |X | . AsJ 1 , · · · ,J M are independent, the probability that there are more than αM/10 bad choices for m is at most (1) . M .
An analysis similar to that of Event E 3 shows that Pr[
We analyze event E 5 assuming that event E 1 occurs, in which case 
That is, the probability that h m does not perfectly hash the elements of H b is at most . 
We analyze event E 6 assuming that event E 2 occurs, in which case for every b, m we have that
Thus, by Markov's inequality, we have that
Let us say that m is bad for x if
So m is bad with probability at most
As the hash functions h 1 , . . . , h M are independent, assuming that Y ≥ 2C 1 ·log C M +1 |X |, the probability that there are more than αM/10 bad choices for m is at most . 
By the properties of algorithm Hashtogram (Theorem 3.9), we have that m is bad with probability at most 1 log C M |X | . As the coins of Hashtogram are independent across different executions (i.e., for Session: Algorithms, Privacy and Workflows PODS'18, June 10-15, 2018, Houston, TX, USA different values of m), the probability that there are more than α |M 4 |/10 bad choices for m ∈ M 4 is at most (1) .
Setting C M ≥ 20 α and using the union bound over every
We are now ready to complete the proof, by showing that whenever E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 , E 5 , E 6 , E 7 occur we have that every heavy element x ∈ H appears in the output list H . To that end, fix x ∈ H ,
. Observe that |M x | ≥ (1 −α)M. We now show that for every m ∈ M x it holds that
m , in which case, by the properties of the code (Enc, Dec) we have that
Hence, by Event E 7 we have that
where
On the other hand, let z Enc(x) m , and recall that by Event 
By Inequalities (2) Therefore, it suffices to show that L д(x ) m contains at most O(log |X |) pairs (y, z) that are added because they do not correspond to a heavy element x ′ ∈ H .
To that end, observe that by the condition on step 3b, and by Event E 7 , in order for a pair (y, z) to be added to L д(x ) m it must be that
However, by Event E 2 , there are at most
elements in S m that yield the same value д(x), but are not generated from a heavy element. Hence, there could be at most
ADVANCED GROUPOSITION AND MAX-INFORMATION
In this section, we show that local differential privacy admits stronger guarantees of group privacy than differential privacy in the central model. In particular, the protection offered to groups of size k under LDP degrades proportionally to about √ k, a quadratic improvement over what happens in the central model. It is not a coincidence that this behavior mirrors the privacy guarantee of differentially private algorithms under composition. Indeed, the proof of our "advanced" group privacy bound will follow the same strategy as the proof of the so-called advanced composition theorem [9, 10] . Define the privacy loss random variable L A, B to be ℓ A, B (y) for y ← A.
Just as in the proof of the advanced composition theorem, we will leverage the fact that the expected privacy loss of any individual local randomizer is
, which is substantially smaller than the worst-case privacy loss of ε. Since each local randomizer is applied independently, the cumulative privacy loss incurred by changing a group of k inputs concentrates to within O( √ kε) of its expectation O(kε 2 ). . Let x ∈ X n and x ′ ∈ X n differ in at most k entries for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Let A = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) : X n → Y be ε-LDP. Then for every δ > 0 and ε ′ = kε 2 /2 + ε 2k ln(1/δ ), we have
In particular, for every δ > 0 and every set T ⊆ Y , we have
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that x and x ′ differ in the first k coordinates. Since each randomizer is applied Session: Algorithms, Privacy and Workflows PODS'18, June 10-15, 2018, Houston, TX, USA independently, we may write the privacy loss between A(x) and A(x ′ ) as
Hence, by Hoeffding's inequality, we have that for every t > 0,
Setting t = ε 2k ln(1/δ ) completes the proof.
We remark that it is straightforward to extend Theorem 4.2 to handle (ε, δ )-LDP algorithms using the same ideas as in the proof of the advanced composition theorem (see the discussion in Section 2.2 of [26] ). . Let x ∈ X n and x ′ ∈ X n differ in at most k entries for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Then for every δ ′ > 0, ε ′ = kε 2 /2 + ε 2k ln(1/δ ′ ), and every set T ⊆ Y , we have
Our improved group privacy bound immediately implies a strong bound on the max-information of an LDP protocol. The max information [7] of an algorithm is a measure of how much information it reveals about a randomly chosen input. The motivation for studying max-information comes from its ability to ensure generalization in adaptive data analysis. Here, Z ⊗W denotes the product distribution formed from the marginals Z andW . Given an algorithm A : X n → R, we say the β-approximate
Dwork et al. [7] showed that ε-DP algorithms have max information O(εn). Moreover, they have β approximate max-information O(ε 2 n + ε n log(1/β), but only when the input distribution D is a product distribution. Subsequent work by Rogers et al. [22] extended this analysis to (ε, δ )-DP algorithms, for which they showed the restriction to product distributions to be necessary.
Using our group privacy bound for local differential privacy, we show that even under non-product distributions, the max information of ε-LDP protocols has the same behavior as ε-DP algorithms on product distributions. This provides a distinct advantage in adaptive data analysis, as it means ε-LDP algorithms can be composed with arbitrary low max-information algorithms in any order while giving strong generalization guarantees. = Pr
By Theorem 4.2, this quantity as at most β for k=nε 2 /2+ε 2n ln(1/β).
The claim now follows from the general fact that, for any pair of random variables U , V over the same sample space,
COMPOSITION FOR RANDOMIZED RESPONSE
In this section, we give a direct proof showing that k instantiations of randomized response obey privacy guarantees matching advanced composition, even under pure ε-LDP. Specifically, we exhibit for every β > 0 an O(ε k ln(1/β))-LDP algorithm that when run on any given input, yields a distribution which is β-close in statistical distance to the composition of k instances of randomized response. 6 Prior work of Duchi, Jordan, and Wainwright [6] showed that the problem of estimating k binary attributes admits an LDP algorithm with similar guarantees as ours. However, their distribution does not resemble the k-fold composition of randomized response. We interpret our new construction as evidence that an advanced composition theorem for pure ε-LDP might hold for more general, and potentially even interactive mechanisms. Let M i : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} that performs randomized response on the ith bit of its input. On an input x, our algorithm first identifies a "good" set G x of outputs (y 1 , . . . , y k ) ∈ {0, 1} k which have roughly average likelihood of appearing under the composition M(x) = (M 1 (x), . . . , M k (x)). By concentration arguments, M(x) produces an outcome in G x with probability at least 1 − β. Our approximate composed algorithmM(x) simply runs M(x), returns the outcome if it is in G x , and returns a uniformly random element outside G x otherwise. The crux of the privacy argument is to show that elements in this latter case end up being sampled with roughly the same probability as elements in G x .
We obtain the following result. See Algorithm 2 for the construction. The analysis is omitted from this extended abstract. 6 The usual guarantee of advanced composition also includes an additive O (ε 2 k ) term, but our result only applies to the typical setting where ε 2 k ≤ ε √ k . 
Let 0<β < ε 
GENERIC TRANSFORMATION FROM APPROXIMATE TO PURE PRIVACY
In this section we present our generic transformation from any (non-interactive) (ε, δ )-LDP protocol into an O(ε)-LDP protocol with essentially the same utility guarantees. Our transformation is based on rejection sampling, an idea that first appeared in the context of differential privacy in the work of Kasiviswanathan et al. [16] , where it was used to show an equivalence between the local model (under pure-privacy) and SQ learning. Rejection sampling was also used by Bassily and Smith [3] to show that almost any (non-interactive) ε-LDP protocol can be transformed into an ε-LDP protocol where the communication per user is only 1 bit (at the expense of increasing the shared randomness in the protocol). Our transformation is obtained from the transformation of Bassily and Smith with the following two modifications:
(1) The transformation of Bassily and Smith applies to any "sample resilient" ε-LDP protocol. Informally, a sample resilient protocol is one whose outcome on any (distributed) database S is well-approximated by its outcome on a random subset of (roughly) half of the users in S. While we do not know of any protocols which are not sample resilient, we would like to obtain a more general result which avoids this restriction. We show that this restriction can be removed at the expense of increasing per-user communication to O(log log n), where n is the number of users.
(2) We generalize the transformation so that it also holds for any (ε, δ )-LDP protocol. Somewhat surprisingly, instead of obtaining an (ε, δ )-LDP protocol with short user reports, we show that, when done carefully, the resulting protocol actually satisfies pure O(ε)-privacy.
Our generic transformation is given in algorithm GenProt.
Theorem 6.1. Let ε ≤ 1 4 , let 5 ln( 1 ε ) ≤ T ≤ 1−e −ε 4δ e ε n , and let M be an (ε, δ )-LDP protocol. Then Algorithm GenProt satisfies 10ε-LDP. Moreover, for every database S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), the total variation distance between GenProt(S) and M(S) is at most
To interpret the guarantee of this theorem, let β > 0 be a parameter, and suppose δ ≤ εβ/48n ln(2n/β). Then setting T = 2 ln(2n/β) makes this total variation distance at most β. With this setting of parameters, observe that each user must send O(log log n) bits to the server. The analysis is omitted from this extended abstract.
A LOWER BOUND VIA ANTI-CONCENTRATION
In Section 3 we presented a LDP heavy-hitters algorithm with error
Ignoring the dependence on β, this error is known to be optimal. Specifically, Bassily and Smith [3] proved the following lower bound:
Theorem 7.1 ( [3] ). Let ε = O(1) and δ = o 1 n log n . Every noninteractive (ε, δ )-LDP protocol for estimating the frequencies of elements from a domain X must have worst-case error Ω 1 ε n · log |X | with constant probability.
In this section we incorporate a tight dependence on the failure probability β into the lower bound. Specifically, we show Theorem 7.2. Let ε = O(1) and δ = o 1 n log n . Every noninteractive (ε, δ )-LDP protocol for estimating the frequencies of elements from a domain X achieving worst-case error ∆ with probability at least 1 − β must have
In light of Theorem 7.1, we can fix X = {0, 1} and only show a lower bound of Ω 1 ε n · log( 1 β ) . To that end, we strengthen an argument of Chan et al. [5] (see also [14, 26] ) who obtained a lower bound of Ω( √ n) on the error: Theorem 7.3 ([5, 14, 26] ). Let ε ≤ 1/2 and δ < 1/4n. Every (ε, δ )-LDP frequency oracle must have worst-case error Ω( √ n) with constant probability.
We now present a high-level overview of the proof of Theorem 7.2. In this overview, we argue how the result follows from the ideas presented in the previous sections; namely, from advanced Session: Algorithms, Privacy and Workflows PODS'18, June 10-15, 2018, Houston, TX, USA
Algorithm 3 GenProt
Inputs: User's inputs {x i ∈ X : i ∈ [n]}, privacy parameter ε, and parameter T ∈ N. Algorithms used: An (ε, δ )-LDP protocol M with local randomizers A i , i ∈ [n].
1. For every (i, t) ∈ [n]×[T ] generate independent public string: y i,t ← A i (⊥).
2. For user i = 1 to n do (f) Sample д i ∈ H i uniformly, and send д i to the server.
3. Run M(y 1,д 1 , . . . , y n,д n ).
grouposition and from our generic transformation from approximate to pure LDP. However, in the full version of this work we present the proof in a somewhat more streamlined way that does not go through these generic results.
By our transformation from approximate to pure LDP, we may assume without loss of generality that we have a pure ε-LDP protocol A for n users, which for every (distributed) database D ∈ {0, 1} n counts the number of 1's in D to within error ∆ with success probability 1 − β. Our goal is to show that ∆ = Ω 1 ε n · log( 1 β ) . We generate an input to A as follows: For some constant C > 0, denote m = Cε 2 n, and let S = (X 1 , . . . , X m ) ∈ {0, 1} m be a database chosen uniformly at random. Now define D = (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) ∈ {0, 1} n , where Y i = X ⌈im/n ⌉ . That is, the first n m elements in D are X 1 , the next n m elements are X 2 , and so on. Now consider applying the protocol A onto the database D. The remainder of the proof proceeds as follows:
(i) On one hand, the error of A on D is at most ∆, and hence, renormalizing to S, we obtain an estimate of the number of 1's in S with error at most m n ∆ = Cε 2 ∆. (ii) On the other hand, every bit in S has n m = 1 Cε 2 copies in D. By advanced grouposition, we provide every element in S with say ( 1 100 , 1 100 )-DP. Using bounds on the mutual information of a random input and the output of a DP algorithm [3] , we get that (a lot of) the elements in S remain approximately uniform even conditioned on the transcript of the protocol (and they also remain independent). Combining (i) and (ii), and applying an anti-concentration bound to the sum of elements in S, we will get that Cε 2 ∆ |S | · log 1 β = Cε 2 n · log 1 β , which gives the result. The full proof of Theorem 7.2 is omitted from this extended abstract.
